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RECENT DECISIONS
Statute of Frauds - The Promise to Answer for the Debt, Default
or Misdoing of Another - Claimant had commenced an action for
divorce against the deceased's son and expressed to deceased the
intention of filing claim for support of the minor children in the
amount of $75.00 a month. Thereupon deceased orally promised to
see the claimant would be paid $25.00 a month if she would consent
to entry of an award of such sum. Induced by this promise the claim-
ant entered into a written stipulation with the husband for such
payment and brought this action against the estate of deceased for
all installments due and unpaid. Held: The oral promise was void
under the statute of frauds as a promise to answer for the debt,
default or misdoings of another' and the judgment of the trial
court awarding payments to claimant from deceased's estate until
the youngest child becomes of age was reversed. In re Allen's Estate,
25 N.W. 2d 757 (1947, Neb.)
The danger which the Statute seeks to avert springs from the
fact that the promisor has received no benefit from the transaction.
When the promisor has received something for his promise the
circumstances are capable of proof. In the case of an oral guarantee
the promise alone is of evidentiary value and visible evidence of
the promise is necessary to prevent perjury.2
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion the promise was made
to claimant at a time when no decree for any support money had
been entered in the divorce action, and before the husband had
signed the stipulation relative thereto. Thus, there was no primary
liquidated debt in existence when the deceased made his promise and
it is contended the promise is original. The promise is within the
statute of frauds if the primary liability is contemplated.3 It may
be made prior to the principal obligation as an inducement to enter
the contract with the principal debtor.4 The execution of the stipula-
tion, fixing the amount of the husband's liability subsequent to the
agreement will not, standing alone, determine the promise as either
original or collateral.
What is the effect of the deceased's words embracing his promise
that he would "see that it ($25.00) was paid regularly"? In an
Arkansas case 5 a promisor purchased goods for himself and his
crop tenant, and when told that the price of the goods exceeded the
note executed by both, said in reply that his tenant "has a good
I Nebraska R.S. (1943) Section 36-202: "In the following cases every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement or some note or memorandum be in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith ... every special promise
to answer for the debt, default or misdoings of another."
2 Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. II, Section 452.
3Annotation: 19 ALR 1029.
'Union Loan & Savings Ass'n. v. Johnson, 118 Neb. 17, 223 N.W. 467 (1929).
5 Smith v. Westlake, 152 Ark. 384, 238 S.W. 34 (1922).
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crop; let him keep on and I will see that all is paid." The court
held the declaration of the promisor is not equivalent to the phrase
"I'll pay the account", and held the promise to be collateral. In a
later Arkansas case" a vendor refused to deliver coal to a certain
corporation, whereupon the promisor said: "Deliver the coal and
I'll see that you get paid". The court, in finding the promise original,
held the intention of the parties at the time the promise was made
must be regarded in determining the character of the oral promise,
and in the determination of such intention the words of the promise,
the situation of the parties, and all attendant circumstances must be
considered.
In the instant case evidence disclosed that neither the claimant
nor deceased expected the husband to make the payments set forth
in the stipulation. However, such belief was not expressed by either
party when the agreement was entered into. It is submitted that
the court in strictly applying the terms of the Statute may have
ignored the true intent of the parties. It was shown that the husband
drank excessively, was convicted of forging deceased's name to
checks, refused to support the minor children in the past and, since
the divorce, had remarried. In the light of such circumstances it
is unlikely that the parties intended the claimant to look primarily
to the husband for payment. If the promisor becomes primarily, and
not collaterally, liable, the promise is not within the Statute, though
the benefit of the transaction accrues to the husband."
While the promise, if collateral, is void if not in writing; the
oral promise, if original, would fail to bind the promisor unless sup-
ported by a consideration. The detriment resulting to the claimant
by reason of her forebearance to petition the court for an allowance
in excess of the stipulated sum is a consideration." However, some
jurisdictions hold that such consideration is not valid to support the
promise of one to answer for the debt, default or misdoings of
another. In a Minnesota case the plaintiff brought an action to re-
cover on a promissory note. The complaint states that the wife, in
consideration of plaintiff's promise not to enforce the collection from
the husband, orally promised to make the payment. In holding for
the defendant the court said :9
6 Moraz v. Melton, 167 Ark. 629, 268 S.W. 41 (1925).
7 Schultz v. Williams, 207 Wis. 122, 240 N.W. 844 (1932).
sRiegel v. Ormsby, 111 Ia. 10, 82 N.W. 432 (1900); Southern Realty Co. v.
Hannon, 89 Neb. 802, 132 N.W. 533 (1911): "A consideration does not neces-
sarily consist of a direct advantage to the promisor, but may consist of a direct
disadvantage to the promisee."
9 Leytham v. McHenry, 209 Ia. 692, 228 N.W. 639 (1930): "The new or inde-
pendent consideration requisite in such a case must be one moving as a benefit




"As the complaint stood there was nothing to show that the
wife had any interest in the payment of the note; that she
would be benefitted thereby; that she assumed the debt or that
plaintiff agreed to discharge the husband. The agreement al-
leged is a collateral promise on her part to assume the debt,
and is within the statute of frauds."
A few jurisdictions have found the detriment to the promisee
is a sufficient consideration and binds the promisor on his oral
promise. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a de-
fendant's promise to pay the landlord the stipulated rent if the
landlord would not trouble the tenant for the rent until he had
gathered and sold the rest of his crop was an independent contract
founded upon a good consideration and bound the defendant to
perform his oral promise. 3
In the instant case the promisor is not available to testify, and
the court reflects the great caution which is exercised in construing
oral promises to answer for another's obligation. While a more liberal
interpretation of the parties' intent would have relieved the claimant
and her children of a great hardship, the provisions of the Statute
were strictly interpreted.
HUBERT B. WEBER
10 Marrow v. White, 151 N.C. 96, 65 S.E. 746 (1909); Ellis v. Carroll, 68 S.C. 376,
47 S.E. 679 (1904).
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